Parties: Chad Peterson / Morgan County

Issued: July 31, 2025

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Interpretation of Ordinances

The relevant statutory provisions, read together, lead to the conclusion that the owner’s property is a one-lot subdivision for purposes of determining whether the dwelling on the lot qualifies for the statutory exception to a fire sprinkler system in the State Fire Code. Since the owner’s property qualifies for the exception, the county may not require him to install a fire sprinkler system in the dwelling.

Issue 

Does the subject property qualify as a “one-lot subdivision” for purposes of an exception to a fire sprinkler system requirement in the State Fire Code? 

Summary of Advisory Opinion

The relevant statutory provisions, read together, lead to the conclusion that Mr. Peterson’s property is a one-lot subdivision for purposes of determining whether the dwelling on the lot qualifies for the statutory exception to a fire sprinkler system in the State Fire Code. Since Mr. Peterson’s property qualifies for the exception, the County may not require him to install a fire sprinkler system in the dwelling.

Evidence

The Ombudsman’s Office reviewed the following relevant documents and information prior to completing this Advisory Opinion:

1. Request for an Advisory Opinion, submitted by Chad Peterson, received April 16, 2024.
2. Interview with Garrett Smith, attorney for Morgan County, conducted August 15, 2024, and subsequent submittals.
3. Emails from Chad Peterson, submitted on August 18, 2024, September 14, 2024, and October 15, 2024.

Background

Chad Peterson owns property (Parcel ID 01-003-151-03-1) in Morgan County that is not part of a formal subdivision, but that has been determined by Morgan County to be a legal, non-conforming “lot of record.” Essentially, this means that while the property, as it presently exists, was not created via the County’s current subdivision review and approval process, it is nonetheless “legal” and eligible for development because the property was legally created under the laws that existed when the property was divided around 1941 or 1947. See Morgan County Lot of record determination, File #18-049, dated November 15, 2018.

Accordingly, because of its legal non-conforming status, the owner may build a single-family home on the property as long as the proposal can meet all other requirements of the applicable zoning district and other relevant laws and codes.

In recent years, Mr. Peterson applied for a building permit to construct a home on the property. In approving the permit, Morgan County imposed a requirement that the dwelling must have adequate fire protection in accordance with the International Fire Code (IFC). The County asserts that IFC 507.1 requires any newly built homes to have an “approved water supply capable of supplying the required fire flow for fire protection.” International Fire Code § 507.1. According to the County, Mr. Peterson’s home is too far away from any fire hydrants to meet this requirement with a fire hydrant system. The County has stated that the Fire Code Official “is aware that there are limited approved water systems in the county capable of delivering the fire flows outlined in the IFC.” Email from Garret Smith to Brody Flint, dated January 12, 2024.

Therefore, the County asserts that the Code Official, instead of requiring a water supply as outlined in IFC section 507.1, exercised its discretion granted in the Fire Code to simply require Mr. Peterson to install a fire sprinkler system in the home.

However, Mr. Peterson contests that the County possesses the authority to require him to install a fire sprinkler system in his home. Utah Code section 15A-5-203 adds a provision to the International Fire Code that states, “[a]n authority having jurisdiction over a structure built in accordance with the requirements of the International Residential Code as adopted in the State Construction Code, may require an automatic fire sprinkler system for the structure only by ordinance and only if [certain conditions exist].”

Neither party appears to contest that the appropriate conditions exist that would allow the County to require the Peterson home to have an automatic fire sprinkler system. However, State Code also inserts the following exception:

(vi) Exception: A single family dwelling does not require a fire sprinkler system if the dwelling:

(A) is located outside the wildland urban interface;

(B) is built in a one-lot subdivision; and

(C) has 50 feet of defensible space on all sides that limits the propensity of fire spreading from the dwelling to another property.

Utah Code § 15A-5-203(1)(vi).

Mr. Peterson asserts that his situation satisfies all three of the above conditions, and that the County is therefore expressly prohibited by State Code from requiring a fire sprinkler system in his home since the exception plainly states that were the conditions are met, the single family dwelling “does not require a fire sprinkler system.” The County agrees that Mr. Peterson’s home can satisfy conditions (A) and (C), but that the home does not satisfy condition (B) because the property on which the home is built does not qualify as a “one-lot subdivision.”

In light of this dispute, Mr. Peterson has requested an advisory opinion from our Office to determine specifically whether, in accordance with applicable rules of legal interpretation, Mr. Peterson’s home is built on a one-lot subdivision and therefore qualifies for the exemption from a fire sprinkler system under State law. This advisory opinion will specifically address this interpretive question the parties have presented of whether or not Mr. Peterson’s property constitutes a one-lot subdivision.

Analysis

When interpreting a statute, the objective is “to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the act was meant to achieve.” State v. Hunt, 2018 UT App 222, ¶ 17 (quotation   simplified). “Because the best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute itself, [a court will] look first to the plain language of the statute.” GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Utah State Univ. Research Found., 2018 UT 50, ¶ 15 (quotation simplified). “Sometimes, the statutory text may not be ‘plain’ when read in isolation, but it may become so in light of its linguistic, structural, and statutory context.” Hayes v. Intermountain GeoEnvironmental Servs., 2019 UT App 112, ¶ 11 (quoting Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9) (cleaned up).

Additionally, we presume “the legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14. Finally, it is important to note that where a reasonably well-informed person could understand a land use regulation to have more than one meaning—in other words, when the statute is ambiguous—the regulation should be strictly construed in favor of the property owner, since land use regulations are in derogation of an owner’s common-law right to unrestricted use of their land. Patterson v. Utah County Bd. Of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. of App. 1995).

The State Land Use Development & Management Act (LUDMA), found in the Utah State Code at Chapter 17-27a, defines a subdivision as “any land that is divided, resubdivide, or proposed to be divided into two or more lots or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, for offer, sale, lease, or development either on the installment plan or upon any and all other plans, terms, and conditions.” Utah Code § 17-27a-103(81)(a). For purposes of LUDMA, Mr. Peterson’s property would properly be categorized as a subdivision because his property, as indicated above, was at some point in the 1940’s divided off “for the purpose…for…development.” But the relevant statutes indicates that the property must specifically be a “one-lot” subdivision. Because we cannot ignore words when interpreting a statute, we must therefore also determine whether Mr. Peterson’s property is a lot.

To support its argument that Mr. Peterson’s property does not qualify as a one-lot subdivision for purposes of qualifying for the Fire Code exception articulated above, the County refers to LUDMA’s definition of a lot as “a tract of land, regardless of any label, that is created by and shown on a subdivision plat that has been recorded in the office of the county recorder.” Utah Code § 17-27a-103(49).

The County asserts that because Mr. Peterson’s property was not legally established by the modern subdivision process that would have resulted in a lot “shown on a subdivision plat that has been recorded in the office of the county recorder,” the property cannot be properly defined as a lot. Instead, the County contests, Mr. Peterson’s lot of record is, for purposes of LUDMA, a metes and bounds described “parcel” because it is not a lot and LUDMA defines a parcel as “any real property that is not a lot.” The County concludes that because LUDMA defines Mr. Peterson’s property as a parcel instead of a lot, his property cannot be a “one-lot subdivision.”

However, there is more to the analysis. The term we are interpreting is found in the International Fire Code, which has its own definition section. While the Fire Code does not appear to separately define a subdivision, it does have its own definition of a lot. The Fire Code defines a lot as “[a] portion or parcel of land considered as a unit.” International Fire Code (2021) § 202. This definition is much broader than LUDMA’s definition of a lot, and would certainly include Mr. Peterson’s property. The legislature has specifically adopted the International Fire Code, except as amended, as the State Fire Code Act, see Utah Code § 15A-5-103(1), and is the “code to which cities, counties, fire protection districts, and the state shall adhere in safeguarding life and property from the hazards of fire and explosion.” Id. § 15A-1-403(1)(a)(ii). Therefore, for purposes of Fire Code requirements, the defined terms in the International Fire Code are to be applied as controlling state law.

Accordingly, taking each of these terms together in context, and in light of the interpretive rule that any ambiguity should be strictly construed in favor of the property owner, we conclude that Mr. Peterson’s property satisfies the definitions of both a lot and a subdivision, and is therefore property categorized as a one-lot subdivision for purposes of determining whether the property qualifies for the exception listed above. Because Mr. Peterson’s property qualifies for the exception, the Fire Code “does not require a fire sprinkler system” for the dwelling.

Conclusion

The relevant statutory provisions, read together, lead to the conclusion that Mr. Peterson’s property is a one-lot subdivision for purposes of determining whether the dwelling on the lot qualifies for the statutory exception to a fire sprinkler system in the State Fire Code. Since Mr. Peterson’s property qualifies for the exception, the County may not require him to install a fire sprinkler system in the dwelling.

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Jordan S. Cullimore, Lead Attorney

Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman

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NOTE:

This is an advisory opinion as defined in Section 13-43-205 of the Utah Code. It does not constitute legal advice, and is not to be construed as reflecting the opinions or policy of the State of Utah or the Department of Commerce. The opinions expressed are arrived at based on a summary review of the factual situation involved in this specific matter, and may or may not reflect the opinion that might be expressed in another matter where the facts and circumstances are different or where the relevant law may have changed. 

While the author is an attorney and has prepared this opinion in light of the author’s understanding of the relevant law, the author does not represent anyone involved in this matter. Anyone with an interest in these issues who must protect that interest should seek the advice of his or her own legal counsel and not rely on this document as a definitive statement of how to protect or advance his or her interest. 

An advisory opinion issued by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is not binding on any party to a dispute involving land use law. If the same issue that is the subject of an advisory opinion is listed as a cause of action in litigation, and that cause of action is litigated on the same facts and circumstances and is resolved consistent with the advisory opinion, the substantially prevailing party on that cause of action may collect reasonable attorney fees and court costs pertaining to the development of that cause of action from the date of the delivery of the advisory opinion to the date of the court’s resolution. Additionally, a civil penalty and consequential damages may also be available if the court finds that the opposing party—if either a land use applicant or a government entity—knowingly and intentionally violated the law governing that cause of action.

Evidence of a review by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman and the opinions, writings, findings, and determinations of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman are not admissible as evidence in a judicial action, except in small claims court, a judicial review of arbitration, or in determining costs and legal fees as explained above.

The Advisory Opinion process is an alternative dispute resolution process. Advisory Opinions are intended to assist parties to resolve disputes and avoid litigation. All of the statutory procedures in place for Advisory Opinions, as well as the internal policies of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman, are designed to maximize the opportunity to resolve disputes in a friendly and mutually beneficial manner. The Advisory Opinion attorney fees and civil penalty provisions, found in Section 13-43-206 of the Utah Code, are also designed to encourage dispute resolution. By statute they are awarded in very narrow circumstances, and even if those circumstances are met, the judge maintains discretion regarding whether to award them.